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A P. RICHARDSON

Editor

EDITORIAL
Classification of Profits on Investments
The January issue of The Journal of Accountancy con
tained an editorial entitled Classification of Profits on Invest
ments, which seems to have aroused a good deal of interest and
some opposition. Among the adverse comments received is a
letter from John Bauer, who for many years has been an oc
casional and valued contributor to The Journal of Account
ancy.
So that the matter may have full discussion we reproduce the
substance of Mr. Bauer’s letter herewith:
The leading editorial of the January number of The Journal of Ac
countancy took a position opposed to the recent decision in the case of

Brewster v. Walsh by the federal district court of Connecticut, holding that
profits realized from the sale of investments or capital assets are not income
and, therefore, are not taxable under the sixteenth amendment of the
constitution.
The decision raises fundamental issues which should be thoroughly dis
cussed in their various economic, accounting and legal aspects before a final
determination is made by the supreme court of the United States. The
issues are such as naturally to call forth uncompromising opinion in favor
of or against the decision, and it is hardly safe to say what position the
economists and accountants in general would take. I do believe, however,
that the editorial brushed aside rather ungenerously the opposing opinion
which might favor the decision. I doubt whether there is a single economist
who approaches the problem from the standpoint that “whatever is spent is
ipso facto income,” but there is a large group of economists who would
consider the decision to square with sound economic principle.
The question at issue is, of course, one of economic fact and should be
decided on that basis. As a nation, we decided upon a federal income tax
and amended the constitution for that purpose. Any tax, therefore, author
ized by congress should be limited to income and should not be levied on
any other basis. The question, therefore, is: What is income? Is there
a fundamental distinction between capital and income ? Is increase in capital
value income?
The economists who are in accord with the Brewster decision base
their position upon the fundamental relation of capital and income. They
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hold that capital value represents capitalized income, that the value of an
investment is equal to the present discounted value of the expected earnings
from the property. Capital value increases or decreases with the increase
or decrease in expected income. Income discounted at the market rate of
interest is capital value. The relation of income and capital is that of cause
and effect. An income tax is undoubtedly levied on the cause, but can it
be levied also on the effect? If there is an increase in income, the addition,
as such, would unquestionably be taxable as income, but may also the con
sequent increase in capital be counted as income and be subject to an in
come tax?
The general view just expressed may be illustrated. Suppose A had real
estate that had cost him $100,000 and, on that basis, had brought a net rental
of $8,000 a year. Assume then that rentals have doubled and promise to
continue at $16,000 a year. On th?s basis the property is worth $200,000,
and it has this actual value to the owner whether it is sold or not. There
can be no question that the increase in rental from $8,000 to $16,000 a year
is additional income and subject to tax, but is the consequent increase in
capital value from $100,000 to $200,000 also to be counted as income?
Under the law, such increase in capital value is not taxable until realized
through sale or exchange for other property, but does this limitation have
any real bearing on the issue? Suppose A sells for $200,000; all he can
do is to reinvest, and on ordinary investments will again receive an income
of $16,000 a year which would be taxable. It is because of this doubled
income that he has a double capital value. The income tax as such would
reach the additional income, but would leave intact the resulting increase
in capital.
It is true that A has increased his net worth by $100,000, but this is
due to the fact that he has increased his income from $8,000 to $16,000 a
year. If the additional income is taxed, A pays his full burden from the
standpoint of an income tax. If, however, he is taxed also on $100,000 of
the value of his investment, he is taxed on capital and not on income. More
over, if he is taxed on the $100,000 increase in capital the government en
croaches on his investment and reduces his future income. After paying
the taxes at prevailing rates, he would only have $160,580 to reinvest in
stead of $200,000 for which he sold the property. His new investment,
therefore, at 8% would bring only $12,846 a year instead of the previously
established income of $16,000 a year.
The tax on the increase in capital value is a capital tax and not an
income tax. Its result is to reduce capital and to diminish the future tax
able income. If the increase in income is taxed as income, the correspond
ing increase in capital value cannot be taxed also as income.
It may be urged that the purpose of the income tax is to tax people on
the basis of their ability to pay, and that the increase of $100,000 in A’s
net worth represents such an increase in ability. It is true that the income
tax law is designed to tax according to ability, but ability may be measured
in one of two ways: (1) according to income, or (2) according to capital.
The sixteenth amendment provides for the taxation of income and not of
capital. A’s ability to pay was measured in the first instance by $8,000 a
year with the capital value of $100,000, and then by $16,000 a year with the
capital value of $200,000. The tax should rest, therefore, upon the income
and not also upon the resulting capital value.
The issue may be approached also from the standpoint of changes in
price level to show that an increase in capital value is not income. Since
1914, prices in general have doubled, so that the present equivalent in money
income, or money capital, is twice that of 1914. Suppose, then, that A’s
property was worth $100,000 in 1914 and brought $8,000 a year; then to
maintain the equivalent at the present time it must be worth $200,000 now
and bring $16,000 a year in income. If he sells and is taxed for the $100,000
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so-called profits, obviously he is left worse off than in 1914, and the gov
ernment has seized some of his capital and has left him a smaller relative
income than he had before.
The change in price levels is, of course, the chief factor affecting in
creases in investment value since 1913, from which date the so-called profits
on the sales of capital assets are computed. During this period, in practic
ally all cases, the sale of investments has resulted in so-called profits, and
the tax on the amounts has resulted in diminishing the individual’s future
income and reducing his actual capital. The matter, however, should .be
viewed not only from the taxpayer’s standpoint, but also from the viewpoint
of the government. The purpose, of course, has been to tax the nation’s
income and not something else, but if we count as income the increase in
capital value that has taken place since 1913 because of the shifting in price
levels, we are manifestly pulling ourselves up, as a nation, by our boot
straps. By this procedure we count not only the nation’s actual income from
the operation of its farms, factories and industry, but we count also the
general increases in property values that have followed the rise in price
levels. We count as income the effect of price levels upon capital values and
thus cut into our actual capital.
The analysis set forth, I believe, is entirely in accord with general ac
counting practice. In any event, however, it is the primary function of the
accountant to determine what are the facts and then record them according
to suitable classification. If the increase in capital assets is not income, the
accountant will have no difficulty in showing this fact, as he would be able
to show the increase as income if it were properly so counted.
The general purpose of accounting may be stated to keep a record of
investment and income. My belief is that very few accountants would
include in the income statement of a period profits realized from the sale
of investments or capital assets. Such profits would almost invariably be
credited to surplus and not to income account. The latter would include
gains realized through operation of plants and other returns from business
assets, but it would not include any adjustment in the value of capital items.
The practice just described of crediting so-called profits realized on the
sale of capital assets to surplus and not to income is followed in the various
classifications of accounts prescribed by the interstate commerce commission
in the case of the railroads and other public utilities under its jurisdiction.
It is carried out, also, I believe, by all the classifications of the various state
public utility commissions and would be accepted by most competent ac
countants.
In ordinary business, the terms “income” and “profits” are used loosely,
and there is, in such use, no guide in the present issues. The ordinary busi
ness man understands little of accounting, and there could be no serious
purpose to base accounting classifications upon the ordinary business man’s
views. We have to deal in accounting and economics with technical matters
which should be determined from a scientific standpoint and not according
to loose every-day usage of terms.
I agree fully with the editorial view that the broadest possible interpreta
tion should be given to the term “income,” leaving determination of the
forms of income to be considered by congress. But shall we go so far as to
change the entire purpose of the sixteenth amendment? Shall we stretch
the meaning of income to include capital, and shall we levy a capital tax
under the term of “income tax” ?
These are far-reaching questions, and I firmly believe that it is much
better policy to stick to an income tax until we actually decide upon a capital
levy. These matters fortunately can now be squarely placed before the
supreme court of the United States in passing upon the Brewster case and
similar cases now pending.
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The editorial in question was reprinted by the New York
Evening Post, and a reply to the editorial from Mr. Bauer was
published in that paper. The substance of Mr. Bauer’s letter to
the Evening Post was practically the same as that of his letter
to The Journal of Accountancy.
Following the publication of Mr. Bauer’s letter in the Evening
Post a communication from George O. May was printed in that
paper, and as it deals with the matter comprehensively we re
produce his comments:
Referring to the editorial article on the case of Brewster against Walsh,
which you recently quoted from The Journal of Accountancy, I believe
Judge Thomas felt constrained by decisions of the supreme court to hold
that profits on the sale of investments were not income. Inasmuch, however,
as your correspondent, Mr. Bauer, suggests that such a decision is also
required by sound economic principles, it may be permissible to discuss the
question on its merits, ignoring for the moment the effect of any past legal
decisions.
Approaching the question in this way, I would like to suggest:
(1) That even economists are by no means all agreed in the support of
the position taken by Mr. Bauer.
(2) That the best opinion among those qualified to express opinions,
apart from the economists, would not support the position that increases in
capital assets are never income. And
(3) That the injustice and other evil consequences that would ensue
from such a ruling would be far greater than could flow from the opposite
decision.
In considering this question it must always be borne in mind that it is
not the wisdom of taxing such profits, but the right to tax them, which is
involved. The sixteenth amendment gave congress the right to tax in
comes from whatever source arising: the plural itself is suggestive. Cer
tainly the amendment does not seem to contemplate any abstract but rigid
economic concept as the limit to be placed on congress, nor does it specify
the group of economists whose interpretation shall prevail.
It must also be remembered that there is a converse to the proposition,
and that if increments of capital are in no circumstances income, decrements
of capital cannot be allowed to enter into the computation of income. If,
therefore, a machine is employed for ten years in the production of an
article and then sold as scrap, the net income would require to be computed
without any allowance for the difference between the cost and the scrap
value of the machine.
Furthermore, increments and decrements of capital may arise from dif
ferent causes, involving materially different considerations; these may con
veniently be illustrated by the cases of:
(a) The rise in value of a bond bought at a discount between the date
of purchase and maturity, or, conversely, the decline of a bond bought at a
premium.
(b) The rise or fall in value of a bond due to a fall or rise in interest
rates.
(c) The rise or fall in the value of a plant due to a general change in
price levels.
If the question whether profits from appreciation of capital assets should
be treated as being sometimes or always income were referred to a con
ference, in which in addition to economists there would be representatives
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of accountants, actuaries, bankers, bond buyers and business men gen
erally, I think there would be practical unanimity among all except the
economists in favor of the proposition that increments or decrements in
class A, including all those due to conditions inherent in the form of invest
ment, are both in theory and practice in the nature of income, and I believe
this proposition would find very considerable support from the economic
group; indeed, at the recent meeting of the American Economic Association
at Atlantic City I found that there was at least a very respectable body of
economic opinion in favor of the view that all increases of capital assets are
income.
Turning to class B—appreciations or depreciations representing increase
or decrease in exchange value due to external causes—I think a wide range
of opinion would be found to exist, with a middle group suggesting that in
theory whether appreciation or depreciation should be included in compu
tations of income might depend on the motive of the taxpayer; that is to say,
whether he was buying primarily as an investor for the sake of annual in
come or as a speculator or trader.
In the case of increments or decrements of the third class—changes in
money value of an asset due solely to a change in the value of money and
not containing any element of increase or decrease in exchange Value—I
think a majority would probably agree that in theory such increments or
decrements did not enter into the determination of income, and that if it
were possible to segregate them they should be excluded from the operations
of an income tax.
If, then, the body should proceed to make concrete recommendations, I
believe it would hold that it was impossible to administer an income tax
on a basis which would require the treasury department to determine the
motives of taxpayers and analyze the causes of every appreciation or de
preciation of a capital asset. It would also, I believe, hold that it was better
for the commonwealth that a few taxpayers should be taxed on profits which
theoretically might contain an element of increase of capital father than
that it should be put in the power of congress to determine income without
any deduction for the exhaustion of capital necessarily involved in the pro
duction of income.
Holding these convictions, I shall share the regrets of The Journal of
Accountancy if now, after hundreds of thousands of transactions have
taken place, and hundreds of millions of taxes have been paid under a law
taxing profits on the sale of capital assets, and allowing losses on such sales
as a deduction from taxable income, the supreme court shall feel constrained
on legal grounds to hold such a law unconstitutional.
If I could be privileged to attend such a conference as I have mentioned,
I should be tempted to remind it of the testimony before the British royal
commission on income tax of Dr. J. C. Stamp, who combines a grasp of
theory, practical experience and broad common sense in an extraordinary
degree. In his testimony he suggested that—
“The wanton and bigoted way in which persons obsessed with
certain mathematical ideas urge the sacrifice of all practical
points to their lust for algebra would be a serious public danger
if their influence became great.”
I would suggest, more mildly, that it would be unwise to attach undue
weight to the insistence of certain economists on the line of fundamental
distinction they would seek to establish between capital and income, espe
cially as the fundamental difference most apparent to the lay observer is
the difference in views among the economists themselves.

We question Mr. Bauer’s view that not a single economist
holds that “whatever is spent is ipso facto income,” but we would
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point out that in our editorial we merely said that those who
would approve the decision would include any such economists.
Certainly there is a considerable number of economists who hold
that whatever is not spent is not income. It would seem to
follow, therefore, that whatever is spent is, in their view, income.
“Are savings income?” is, we believe, a favorite topic of debate
among economists.
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